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WELCOME AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
SEAN GRIFFITH: Welcome everyone. My name is Sean Griffith. 
I’m the T.J. Maloney Chair in Business Law here at Fordham and 
Director of the Fordham Corporate Law Center. It’s my great pleasure to 
welcome you to the Fourteenth Annual Albert A. DeStafano Lecture on 
Corporate Securities and Financial Law. We’re delighted to have former 
Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice Myron T. Steele here to give 
tonight’s lecture on “Continuity and Change in Delaware Corporate Law 
Jurisprudence.” I want to thank you all for coming, especially to the 
many members of our board of advisors that I see tonight. Also the 
Becker Ross Law Firm and Howard Justvig who’s in attendance tonight. 
The many students that I see, thank you. The alums who are here as 
well. And of course, I have to thank Ann who is floating around here 
somewhere without whom we couldn’t do anything here at the 
Corporate Center. I’ll be introducing Justice Steele shortly. 
The Corporate Center is grateful for the sponsorship of the Becker 
Ross firm in establishing this lecture for their former partner Albert A. 
DeStefano. Albert DeStefano started at Fordham Law School as an 
evening student. He worked during the day and still managed to make 
Law Review and graduate at the top of his class. He went on to become 
a partner at the Becker Firm, specializing in corporate matters, 
particularly mergers and acquisitions. In his spare time, he devoted 
himself to charitable causes and worked here as an adjunct professor, 
sharing his enormous knowledge and experience with our students. 
Albert passed away in 2012, but through this lecture, he continues to 
inspire passion for corporate practice in others. In his honor, we’re 
thrilled to welcome to deliver the Fourteenth Annual Albert A. 
DeStefano Lecture former Delaware Supreme Court Chief Justice 
Myron T. Steele. 
Justice Steele graduated from the University of Virginia and 
received both his J.D. and LL.M. from the University of Virginia School 
of Law. He served on active duty in the U.S. Army and retired as a 
Colonel in the Delaware Army National Guard. He began his legal 
career in Delaware with the firm of Prickett, Jones, and Elliott of 
Wilmington and Dover, where he remained for eighteen years, 
eventually becoming a litigation partner. He’s a twenty-five year veteran 
of the Delaware Judiciary. In 2000, he was appointed to Delaware’s top 
court and became the Chief Justice in 2004, just stepping down from 
that role at the end of last November. 
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While he was on the bench, Justice Steele published more than 
three hundred opinions involving disputes among members of limited 
liability companies, limited partnerships, shareholders, and managers of 
publically traded and closely held corporations. He was highly regarded 
among his colleagues as a consensus builder and successfully balanced 
board authority with shareholder rights. While he presided over the 
court during one of the most dramatic periods of change in corporate 
law, the court sometimes gave more latitude in the obligations of board 
members to their investors and sometimes enforced very large damages 
claims where directors had ignored important conflicts of interest. 
Beyond his work in the courtroom, Justice Steele speaks and 
frequently writes on issues of corporate governance and corporate law, 
including a brilliant 2005 article in the Business Lawyer entitled “On 
Corporate Law Federalism: Threatening the Thaumatrope.”1 He loves to 
tell people about the Thaumatrope. The Chief Justice previously taught 
at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and currently teaches at 
Pepperdine Law School in the winter and the University of Virginia 
Law School where he’s a regular member of the faculty. Justice Steele 
has consistently appeared in annual lists of leading lawyers in America 
and top judges in America. He’s served as the President of the 
Conference of Chief Justices of the United States and as a Chairman of 
the Board of Directors of the National Center for State Courts. In 
October 2012, he received the Judicial Leadership Award from the U.S. 
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform. It’s a pleasure to have Justice 
Steele with us tonight. Please join me in welcoming him to Fordham 
Law School.  
																																																																																																																																
 1. Sean J. Griffith & Myron T. Steele, On Corporate Law Federalism: 
Threatening the Thaumatrope, 61 BUS. LAW. 1 (2005). 
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LECTURE: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN DELAWARE CORPORATE LAW 
JURISPRUDENCE 
CHIEF JUSTICE STEELE: Thank you very much Professor 
Griffith. In the spirit of candor, something with which all Delaware 
Lawyers are constantly either at odds or reminded of, the article that 
Professor Griffith talked about was co-authored by Professor Griffith 
and myself.2 We won’t talk about who did most of the thinking or who 
did most of the writing, but I’m not going to let him get away without 
taking credit. The Thaumatrope was his idea, it took him awhile to 
explain it to me, but after he got through to me, I completely bought into 
the entire thesis. 
It’s a privilege to be here tonight, to be a part of this lecture series, 
and to be at Fordham Law School. One of my favorite law clerks when I 
was on the Supreme Court is a Fordham Law School graduate, Nate 
Emertiz. You should be very proud of him, the job he did for the court, 
and the lawyer that he has become in Delaware. For all the students 
here, you could look no further to find a better example of a graduate of 
Fordham who has excelled in the corporate law arena in a state that’s 
known for its corporate law. 
Well, let me begin by suggesting that the following quote is a 
recurring theme, not just of this address, but in my mind throughout my 
entire career involved in corporate law. And it’s very appropriate 
because I’m quoting Justice Brandeis, someone from New York. He 
said, “that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as 
a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without 
risk to the rest of the country.”3 Although he said this in a dissent, these 
are words that I always remember and repeat as often as I can. And 
whenever I can make a Federalist statement like that and attribute it to 
Justice Brandeis and the City of New York, I’m not missing the 
opportunity. 
As Professor Griffith pointed out, I’m no longer Chief Justice. I 
told him, “if you ask me to do it on this date, I will no longer be what he 
referred to as a quote ‘distinguished jurist.’” I told him “there’s a risk 
that on March 6, 2014 I might not be a jurist any longer.” That’s the bad 
news—I’m not the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court 
																																																																																																																																
 2. Id. 
 3. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 387 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
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anymore. The good news, particularly for this lecture, is that I can draw, 
nevertheless, on forty-three years of practice, twenty-five years as a 
judge, and comment far more freely on trends developing in the 
Delaware courts related to the internal governance of Delaware 
corporations than I ever could when I was a Vice Chancellor or Chief 
Justice. 
My objective tonight is in part to inform, but primarily to be 
provocative. What I want to do in this lecture is to draw your attention 
to what I believe will be predictable changes in corporate governance 
that applies to the internal affairs of Delaware corporations and explain 
why I think the changes are going to happen. If you disagree with those 
predictions, I welcome it. I’m just trying to help you think about what 
will happen going forward. 
There are in fact changes afoot and not just because of substantial 
personnel changes at the highest level on the courts. I swore in our new 
Chief Justice, Leo Strine, last week. We will shortly have a new 
Chancellor, who is taking Chief Justice Strine’s old position. The mere 
fact that those two positions are going to change inevitably says there 
will be new thinking, maybe not of a different generation, but certainly 
from younger people making the decisions. My father was an Army 
officer, and he said, “the only thing you can be guaranteed in the Army 
is when there’s a new post commander, every one-way street will 
immediately be switched to run the other way. All the services in the 
chapel will change. The Jewish, the Catholic, and the Protestant services 
will all switch times, and worst of all, they’ll change the hours of the 
package store.” So there will be changes when leadership changes. But, 
I don’t think you’ll see a change in the approach to the application of 
doctrinal principles or in the doctrines themselves unless they occur 
incrementally and in a way that’s almost entirely predictable and clearly 
thoughtful. 
Because my time here tonight is limited, I will focus on three areas 
that I think bear watching. None are nuanced, none will surprise you, 
but I’m going to talk in broader policy terms, rather than slither through 
the weeds of individual cases. I suspect the students do enough case 
studies in their classrooms, that they don’t need to hear it from me. I do 
not intend my remarks to even pretend to be the presentation of an 
academic paper. These will be, and I use a non sequitur, reflections on 
the future. 
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The framework is as follows: 
First, the impact of ever-increasing multi-forum litigation. What I 
like to refer to as the dance for damages and attorney’s fees. You’re 
probably aware that in M&A, ninety-six percent of deals in 2012 over 
one billion dollars were litigated: 4  sixty-five percent in multi-forum 
jurisdictions and only sixteen percent in Delaware Chancery Court 
alone,5 despite the fact that more than fifty percent of the publically 
traded corporations of this country are chartered in Delaware.6 The rest 
are in various constituency jurisdictions where the plaintiffs believe the 
courts will serve their interests. 
Second, is the so-called Nevada/Delaware/North Dakota debate,7 
which reflects what Justice Brandeis said. Competition between the 
states is exciting in my view. That competition is akin to the competition 
between German and English among our founders when they debated 
whether or not to have an official language. I don’t know German. It’s 
probably a wonderful language to know, but if that’s the debate, it’ll go 
the same direction. And I’ll explain why. 
And last, the impact of so-called shareholder activism. Whatever 
that term may mean to you. 
Any one of these topics, in my view, deserve an hour or more, so I 
can only highlight the issues. I can’t conceivably exhaust even the issues 
that derive from each. 
Now a major caveat. I’m not trying to persuade anyone to accept 
my view or to agree with my predictions, but after almost twenty years 
on Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court and the speaker circuit, 
my predictions flow from some firmly held beliefs. So to be fair to you, 
you should know the direction from which I come. First, private 
ordering shapes better corporate governance than prescriptive legislation 
																																																																																																																																
 4. See OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION 
INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: REVIEW OF 2013 M&A LITIGATION, 2-3 
(2014). 
 5. See ROBERT M. DAINES & OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, 
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: REVIEW OF 2012 
M&A LITIGATION, 2-3 (2013). 
 6. See About Agency, STATE OF DELAWARE: THE OFFICIAL WEBSITE OF THE FIRST 
STATE, http://corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml. 
 7. Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of Nevada as a Liability-Free 
Jurisdiction, 98 VA. L. REV. 935 (2012). 
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and regulation. Second, I distrust what I characterize as faith-based 
corporate governance. Change may be all the rage, but it must flow from 
empirically-based decision making, accompanied by a cost-benefit 
analysis because the latter is, in my view, the only thoughtful way to 
improve performance. Better performance should be the goal and the 
only goal for corporate governance and change in corporate governance. 
The benefits that come to the corporate entity and to investors and the 
community at large, only occur when corporate governance’s direction 
is to improve the performance of the managers, directors, and large 
controlling stockholders of our publicly traded corporations. Now let me 
start on the three areas with some specificity. 
MULTI-FORUM LITIGATION 
First, as a litigator one of my favorite topics is multi-forum 
litigation. Multi-forum litigation is expensive, disruptive, and likely to 
create inconsistent rulings. It also undermines predictability and causes 
uncertainty. And in my view and experience, lack of predictability and 
uncertainty are the arch-enemies of businesses’ and investors’ interests. 
There have been two responses to this ever-increasing problem, 
particularly in the M&A arena. The first is the development of the so-
called forum selection bylaw or clauses in charters. Such bylaws may be 
adopted unilaterally by a board, or a board may propose the bylaw and 
then subject it to a stockholder vote. It gives that corporation the 
opportunity to decide where a suit, brought on its behalf, should be filed, 
which in turn limits the stockholders’ options in where to file the suit.8 
The second way is a combined initiative between the conference of 
Chief Justices of the United States and the Federal Judicial Conference 
to create a template for cooperation between the federal system, which 
refers to this litigation as multi-district, and the states, which generally 
refer to it as multi-forum or multi-jurisdictional litigation. The template 
is now published on the website of the Federal Judicial Center.9 It’s 
intended to suggest to judges how to interact with each other and 
litigants in order to lessen the expense and the likelihood of 
																																																																																																																																
 8. See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 941-42 
(Del. Ch. 2013). 
 9. Ten Steps to Better Case Management: A Guide for Multidistrict Transferee 
Judges, UNITED STATES JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION & FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CENTER (2d Ed. 2014), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/ten-steps-
mdl-judges-2d.pdf/$file/ten-steps-mdl-judges-2d.pdf (last visited Dec. 29, 2014). 
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unpredictability, uncertainty, and inconsistent rulings. Hopefully, it will 
get legs, and trial judges in all areas, not just corporate governance, will 
look to this center’s publication to help develop a cooperative and 
collegial relationship between jurisdictions. 
For years there’s been, at least in Delaware as I understand it, what 
I’ve always believed to be, a sensible plan to handle multi-jurisdiction or 
multi-forum litigation. What Delaware does is yield where our core 
interests are not directly affected. Our new Chief Justice wrote an article 
on the subject four months ago and it suggests to me what will happen 
going forward in Delaware. 10  The first-filed rule, which applied in 
Delaware for many, many years, is archaic. We should look to the best 
interest of the stockholders, rather than just go by rote to who filed the 
suit first and where. Delaware has two options if the suit is filed in 
Delaware, as well as in some other jurisdiction. It can either stay the 
Delaware action or dismiss it outright. And Delaware will do one or the 
other when the issues presented do not affect a core interest of Delaware 
corporate law. 
The fundamental issue, I think, going forward in Delaware’s 
reflection on multijurisdictional litigation or multi-forum jurisdiction is 
when the state’s law might be applied or interpreted for the first time in 
a particular context (i.e., a case of first impression). If so, Delaware will 
not yield. Delaware courts should be the first, as we see it, to address an 
interpretation of the Delaware General Corporation Law or any issues 
that arise that are subject to the internal affairs doctrine.11. And we will 
respect the same principle for other jurisdictions. We have a system in 
Delaware where, under our constitution, questions of law can be 
certified from the federal courts, from the high courts of each of the 
states, from the SEC, and now from bankruptcy judges directly to the 
Delaware Supreme Court.12 
Recently the Ninth Circuit certified a question of law to the 
Delaware Supreme Court that addressed what happened to extinguished 
																																																																																																																																
 10. Leo E. Strine, Jr. et al., Putting Stockholders First, Not the First-Filed 
Complaint, 69 BUS. LAW. 1 (2013). 
 11. See In re First Interstate Bancorp Consol. S’holder Litig., 729 A.2d 851, 865 
(Del. Ch. 1998) (explaining that the internal affairs “doctrine states that the 
management of the internal affairs of a corporation will be subject to the law of the 
state of incorporation”). 
 12. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8). 
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derivative claims in the event of a merger.13 We thought it was helpful to 
sorting out multi-jurisdiction litigation when the Ninth Circuit took the 
time to certify the question to the Delaware Supreme Court, rather than 
undertake the question themselves. That’s a pragmatic solution and an 
alternative I suggest most states should consider. It took an amendment 
to our state constitution14 to permit the practice, but it happened, and it’s 
beneficial, we think, to the development of Delaware law. 
Most importantly, counsel and the courts must work together to 
resolve the multi-forum issue. It can’t be solely affected by the chance 
of a bad or weak case succeeding in a district that’s unfamiliar with 
corporate law. Plaintiffs who have a weak case tend to want to file in a 
district where the judges are not familiar with an issue of corporate law. 
These judges may get an issue of corporate law once every five or ten 
years, or maybe only once in their careers. Alternatively, there are 
districts like the Southern District of New York and Delaware where 
these issues arise frequently. Plaintiff’s lawyers tend to say when they 
have a promising case on the merits, they’ll come to the Southern 
District or to Delaware, but when they have a weak case, they’ll go 
elsewhere. It’s also in part, and sadly I report, fee-driven. Where are the 
plaintiff’s lawyers most likely to excel in achieving a fee for their 
efforts? Not always the jurisdiction that is the logical jurisdiction for the 
case to be filed. 
Now one of the answers I mentioned earlier in the outline—forum 
selection bylaws. Forum selection bylaws are largely an idea arising out 
of the minds of lawyers at Wachtell Lipton here in New York. As a 
matter of contract between stockholders, managers, directors, and the 
corporation itself, the corporation’s board of directors under Section 141 
of our General Corporation Law manages and directs the affairs of the 
corporation.15 They can adopt a bylaw that says for certain cases, suit 
can be filed by our stockholders against us or on our behalf only in a 
particular state. Now logically, when someone charters in a particular 
state, it doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure out that the benefits 
aren’t from a lower franchise tax or from loose accountability standards. 
The benefit is from a court system that’s familiar with the issues that 
will arise, and a court that is efficient and effective at disposing of those 
																																																																																																																																
 13. Arkansas Teacher Ret. Sys. v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 75 A.3d 888 (Del. 
2013). 
 14. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 11(8). 
 15. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141(a) (2014). 
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issues in a way that’s most cost effective to the parties involved. That’s 
what draws the litigation. It makes perfect sense to think in terms of a 
forum selection bylaw if it will restrict litigation uniquely focused on the 
internal affairs of a corporation to one jurisdiction to the exclusion of all 
others. It’s an immediate resolution to the problem of the expense and 
inconsistency I mentioned earlier that can arise out of multi-forum 
jurisdiction. 
Our new Chief Justice recently decided as Chancellor that forum 
selection bylaws unilaterally adopted by a board are facially valid under 
Delaware law.16 It was left for another day, the question of as applied, 
what would the result be after adopting a single foreign selection bylaw? 
This question was addressed in a case from the Northern District of 
California, which came before this Delaware forum bylaw case. In the 
Galaviz case, 17  the Oracle board had adopted unilaterally, a forum 
selection bylaw that designated Delaware as the sole place to litigate 
derivative suits. Now, derivative suits (i.e. suits brought on behalf of the 
corporation) should surprise no one. Logic at least suggests to me that 
the corporation should decide where to bring a suit if they are to bring 
one. And if you’re bringing it on their behalf, can’t they contract with 
you to bring it in a particular state or forum as opposed to others? Well, 
the Federal District Court in Northern California said, I’m not sure about 
the validity under Delaware law, but I don’t have to decide whether this 
is valid under Delaware law. I decide venue and the venue can be in the 
Federal District Court in the Northern District of California.18 But more 
importantly, whether that conclusion is right or wrong, Justice Richard 
Seeborg touched on factors that I think affect “as applied” going 
forward. First, the wrongdoing that the board was accused of, the breach 
of fiduciary duty, occurred before the board adopted the forum selection 
bylaw. The stockholders of course, in order to pursue a derivative suit, 
had to own the shares at the time the wrongdoing occurred and had to 
continue to own them. So his view was, well it may be, and again, I 
don’t have to decide it, he says, valid under Delaware law. I’ll let a 
Delaware court decide that. But basically without using the same 
language, Justice Seeborg said the same thing that Chief Justice Strine 
																																																																																																																																
 16. Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 954 (Del. 
Ch. 2013). 
 17. Galaviz v. Berg, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (N.D. Cal 2011). 
 18. See id. at 1175. 
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issued his caveat about. When the forum bylaw is applied, you may not 
be able to successfully implement it.19 
So I suggest to you, that whether you adopt a forum selection 
clause in a charter, which would be ratified in effect by two thirds of the 
stockholders in order to effectively amend the charter, whether the board 
adopts it unilaterally as a bylaw, whether you adopt the bylaw then 
submit it to stockholders for their approval (another prophylactic to 
validate the bylaw), or whether you automatically include a forum 
selection clause in your initial charter, you have to focus on how it will 
ultimately be applied in a real world scenario. It’s all contextual, so it’s 
not an automatic antiseptic that you have a forum selection bylaw. You 
have to be careful, even if you have the legal right to adopt it, in the way 
in which you apply it to make sure the circumstances to which it applies 
fairly treat the stockholders. 
Now what really amazes me about this is opposition from the proxy 
advisors. These in my view are knee-jerk faith-based corporate 
governance inexperts. They oppose all forum selection bylaws, and they 
do so because it restricts stockholder options to sue in various forums. 
Look, didn’t I just say it’s expensive and disruptive to have multi-forum 
jurisprudence or multi-jurisdiction litigation? Why would someone 
advising stockholders say you should oppose something that’s going to 
lower the cost of your investment. To me, it’s just incomprehensible, but 
I’m sure they can explain their rationale for it. Every time I’ve heard 
them explain it, I still don’t get it. 
But I call to your attention this area of the law moving forward 
because it, to me, is very exciting. Whether it is the ultimate solution to 
the problem of multi-jurisdictional litigation or not, there’s going to be a 
fount of litigation as corporations continue to adopt these bylaw or 
charter changes, whether they submit to the shareholders or not, because 
it’s all going to focus on how they’re applied in a given situation. And 
the points Chief Justice Strine made will be litigable points along the 
way. Delaware made its first statement, which is that these clauses are 
facially valid,20 but the litigation is going to focus on how they are 
actually applied in various contexts. 
																																																																																																																																
 19. See id. 
 20. See Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund, 73 A.3d at 954 (holding that a Board-
adopted forum selection bylaw governing disputes as to corporation’s internal affairs 
was facially valid under the statute). 
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SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 
Now, the next part of the framework, shareholder activism. Again, 
define it any way you wish. In my preferred system for the world, and I 
think in the minds of all Delaware judges, engaged if not antagonistic 
stockholders add positive value as a check on director authority and are 
a catalyst for corrective accountability, so long as their efforts focus on 
improved performance and not the advancement of political or personal 
agendas—a major caveat in my view. Delaware courts, it seems to me, 
will increasingly recognize the benefits that engaged investors bring to 
the table. 
Who can ignore the real world de-retailization of stock ownership? 
We now know that, as of 2012, institutional investors hold seventy-five 
percent of the shares in publicly traded US corporations.21 We also know 
that most of these institutional investors either have in-house expertise 
or the capacity to hire experts to help them shape their decision-making. 
We hope that the expertise leads to their desire to improve performance 
and not simply to be disruptive and antagonistic for the reasons that I 
suggested earlier. 
And I believe that the Delaware courts recognize that stockholder 
interests vary. There may be seventy-five percent institutional 
ownership, but it is by no means a monolithic block of interest. They’re 
not sharing the same views, and they don’t agree on interests and 
objectives. They range from long-term investors, like Vanguard or 
Fidelity or some passive pension funds, to arbitrageurs, whose 
investment window is days, maybe sometimes hours, and certainly not 
what some people euphemistically call the long-term of three to five 
years. But they are highly sophisticated. 
I think, as case law moves forward in Delaware, institutional 
investors will continue to be able to act under Delaware law in their own 
interest. This will continue to be the case despite some suggesting the 
image of sharks circling a bloody carcass in the water. And as Chief 
Justice Strine, in my view, famously said recently in a case, well 
actually it said to the lawyers in a transcript and not in an opinion, “what 
troubles you about sharks circling in the water? There is, after all, a 
																																																																																																																																
 21. Frank Aquila & Jinhee Chung, As Institutional Investor Influence Grows: Is 
Now the Time for Shareholder Engagement?, Bloomberg BNA (Jan. 25, 2013), 
http://www.bna.com/as-institutional-investor-influence-grows-is-now-the-time-for-
shareholder-engagement/. 
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bloody carcass there and you have to expect sharks to circle the 
carcass.” The wolf pack theorists, where aggressive investors get 
together in a block interest and frustrate the interest of the balance of the 
stockholders and the corporation itself, is another characterization. 
Delaware, I think, will continue to protect the sacrosanct 
shareholder franchise from board or management interference. I think 
we’ll continue the policy of allowing stockholders who are not 
controllers to vote in their own interest without imposing fiduciary 
duties on them regardless of their shark or wolf pack mentality. They’ll 
still be able to vote and act in their own best interest, regardless of 
motive. 
But there are issues that need to be resolved. Let me call the Air 
Products and Chemicals v. Airgas case to your attention.22 In that case, 
there was a hostile tender offer, which the board opposed, and both a 
poison pill and a staggered board—powerful defensive weapons against 
an unwelcomed hostile tender offer. The board decided that the final 
tender offer fell below the fair value of the corporation’s shares. They 
estimated fair value to be in the range of $120. So, they kept the pill in 
place and fought a slate at a board election committed to remove the 
staggered board. A majority of the board concluded that they would 
trigger the pill and frustrate the tender offer if they must. Chancellor 
Chandler said at the end of the day, I’m constrained by the doctrine in 
Delaware of substantive coercion, which you probably know is the 
theory that the board is there to protect the stockholders from 
themselves because they may do the wrong thing.23 This is troubling to 
me. They may tender at $70 (then a substantial premium to market) 
when the board had analyzed the value of the shares to be $78 in the 
long term, even though it was trading in the mid $40s at the time the $70 
tender offer was put forth.24 His frustration with the constraint I think 
resulted from what I just talked about. He knew that most of those 
stockholders were institutional stockholders. 
Substantive coercion was developed in the 1960’s and 1970’s when 
the majority of stockholders were retail stockholders (and perhaps poor 
investors, like my wife and myself, who didn’t know what the heck they 
were doing, but they invested anyway because it seemed fashionable). 
The doctrine was designed to protect them from ill-advised and hasty 
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uninformed judgments. Chancellor Chandler declined to remove or 
enjoin the pill because he had to rule consistent with precedent. But he 
observed the doctrine has limited value to the court under 
circumstances, as he saw it, where all the information that was material 
to stockholder decision making was in the public domain or came out 
through the course of the litigation, and the directors admitted that the 
stockholders had all the information they needed to exercise rational 
judgment.25 Isn’t there a point in time where the court should enjoin the 
pill? Shouldn’t the stockholders be able to decide freely, without the 
threat of a pill, to accept or reject the tender offer? 
The court should no longer rely on substantive coercion as a basis 
to keep the pill in place. I predict to you it’s only a matter of time before 
substantive coercion is history. Because when you have a seventy-five 
percent institutional stockholder base, it’s not like you’re their guardian. 
They’re perfectly capable of making their own decisions and you can’t 
segregate stockholders and say, “Well, I’m going to protect the five 
percent retail stockholders here,” or “I don’t like the five percent 
arbitragers and the balance are institution investors.” Under Delaware 
law, you can’t segregate shareholders’ interests. You have to treat them 
all as shareholders. 
So my prediction is, if that issue comes to the Delaware Supreme 
Court, and it did not in Air Products, that the result would be different. 
Going forward you’ll see substantive coercion disappear. But that 
doesn’t mean the problem has disappeared. There are still issues. 
Minority investor board members, whether they’re there by election or 
agreement, have issues of dual loyalty. The aggressive activist 
stockholder wants their people on the board. Once they’re on the board 
and they’ve been put there as the result of the action of an activist 
shareholder, to whom do they owe fiduciary duties of loyalty? 
Traditional Delaware law says you owe it to the corporation.26 As soon 
as you get on that board, no matter from whence you come, your duties 
of loyalty and care, and to exercise them in good faith, are owed to the 
corporation and to its stockholders. Not to the entity that may have 
elected you to the board, which may be only one in a multifaceted group 
of stockholders. 
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Vice Chancellor Laster is one of the smartest people I know, and I 
said that when I didn’t have to appear before him. He suggested in a 
speech recently that it’s time to just understand that the world is 
different today, and there will be dual loyalties, and you’ll just have to 
decide whether that duty of loyalty under a particular contextual 
circumstance could be contemporaneously owed and discharged to both, 
or whether it was discharged improperly as to one.27 But, in his words, 
don’t continue this prejudice against activist stockholder board seats and 
those who hold them. Very interesting concept. It is out there compared 
to current Delaware law, but that may be the direction that we’re going. 
Another issue that arises out of the dual loyalty problem is 
confidentiality. You can enter into confidentiality agreements, but how 
do you comply with a confidentiality agreement if you owe a duty of 
loyalty to the person with whom you’re barred from sharing? That 
hasn’t been sorted out. I have no idea how it will be sorted out, but it is a 
very tricky and very difficult question. 
Finally, I want to talk about, the recent investment banker cases, El 
Paso,28 Del Monte,29 and Southern Peru30 and debunk the thought that 
the Delaware judges are attempting to regulate the investment banking 
industry and that lawyers simply don’t “get” conflicts the way 
investment bankers understand and live with conflicts. All the Delaware 
courts are doing in those cases and of course, I assume you have 
knowledge about those cases, is saying that boards, in order to carry out 
their duty of loyalty and care appropriately, should make a fulsome 
investigation into the existence of conflicts with investment bankers and 
then disclose those conflicts. While they may still wish to hire 
investment bankers despite their conflicts, they must disclose their 
rationale for doing so to stockholders. It is not an indictment of 
investment bankers. It is not an attempt to tell investment bankers how 
to run their business. The Delaware judges fully understand that a 
lawyer’s conception of what constitutes a conflict is not the same as an 
investment banker. And there are certainly times in the multi-limited 
partnership arena, such as the publicly traded master limited 
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partnerships that deal in the oil and gas industry, where there are a 
limited number of investment bankers that they can turn to in the first 
place. 
So there will be conflicts. The point is the board, in order to 
discharge its fiduciary duties, needs to find out about the conflicts, 
assess them, make a reasonable business judgment about whether to still 
use that investment banker, and disclose that conflict and what they’ve 
done about it to their stockholders before they ask the stockholders to 
vote on an acquisition or a sale. 
Watch for a case called Rural Metro,31 which is to be decided by 
Vice Chancellor Laster. It’s been under advisement now for a period of 
time. He’s doing the ninety-day dance. We have a rule in Delaware that 
all cases must be decided within ninety days of submission.32 It could 
have been decided today for all I know while I was on the train coming 
here, but watch for that case, because there’s a really significant issue. 
You all know that under most state law and certainly Delaware, 
directors can be exculpated from breaches of their duty of care. But 
when it’s established that they have breached their duty of care, there 
may be no damages assessed to them because they’re exculpated. But, 
what if there’s a corresponding complaint against the investment 
bankers completely subsumed by the same facts on an aiding and 
abetting theory? The law says you can’t be an aider and abettor unless 
there’s an underlying breach. 33  But, what about when there’s an 
underlying breach that’s been exculpated? Is it still a breach? If a tree 
falls in the woods, does it still make a noise? That’s what he’s going to 
answer in Rural Metro. It’s a hugely significant issue because the 
investment banks throughout this country are highly apprehensive about 
the possibility that an underlying board breach of fiduciary duty for 
which directors are exculpated could nevertheless result in damages 
arising out of an aiding and abetting theory being assessed against 
investment banks or other financial advisors. 
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NEVADA, DELAWARE, AND NORTH DAKOTA DEBATE 
Finally, in my view, the best model for corporate governance is a 
fluid, not a static, one. So I turn to define three templates—the so-called 
Nevada, Delaware, and North Dakota debate. 
I’m going to assume that everybody pretty much understands what 
Nevada has added to the competition for better corporate governance. 
I’ll give them the benefit of the doubt, I’ll call it a competition for 
charters. Nevada has said we are going to allow charters to exculpate 
directors for breaches of duty of loyalty.34 A concept that would never 
will be allowed in Delaware. That puts them firmly, in some people’s 
view, on the right in this balancing of authority and accountability, a 
radical shift from traditional fiduciary duty law. Delaware remains in the 
middle. We’re trapped by Section 141 that says directors and no one 
else manages and directs the affairs of the corporation, 35  but we’re 
sensitive to stockholder rights and we hold directors accountable when 
they breach their fiduciary duty of loyalty or when they act with a 
conscious disregard of a known duty, which is our definition of a lack of 
good faith. 
And then there’s North Dakota. In 2007, North Dakota adopted the 
entire smorgasbord of faith-based corporate governance.36 Everything 
you could think of-all twenty-two of the items being discussed in the 
academic world and in the marketplace. I won’t go through them all, but 
if you chartered under North Dakota’s special section of their 
corporation law, you must separate the office of chairman and CEO.37 
Whether it was in the best interest of the corporation or not, there was 
just this assumption that it had to be because the faith based madrassas 
that come up with these ideas of what constitutes corporate governance 
said it was. Majority voting. No staggered boards. Proxy access, 
although that’s been frustrated by the SEC, no one can have proxy 
access now. But they were offering at the time, the same terms that were 
going to be eventually proposed in one of the five bills that resulted in 
watered down Dodd-Frank. 
Now, I personally think it’s fabulous that all those alternatives are 
offered. But if you see it as the left wing view in the competition for 
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charters, well it’s not working out so well. North Dakota had two 
publicly traded corporations in 2007,38 when they adopted everybody’s 
wish list of faith based corporate governance. And just two remain.39 So, 
no vote has yet gained a majority to move from Delaware to North 
Dakota in order to take advantage of faith based corporate governance. 
Stockholders see the smorgasbord for what it is. 
However, Nevada worries me for one important reason. If you 
move too far in protecting directors and frustrating the Common Law 
Fiduciary Duty regime that’s been in place for hundreds of years, you 
run the risk of political entities and constituencies going to the federal 
government and inviting that institution’s meddling. Meddling with all 
the adverse consequences typically flowing from the ill-advised 
presumption that the Feds can and will do a better job than the states. 
History in my view teaches us that federal responses to crises, real or 
perceived, often result in an immediate alleged solution developed in an 
atmosphere super charged by constituency politics overlaid by the Feds 
penchant for refusing to admit mistakes and policy failures that results 
in no corrective action or any process designed for careful reevaluation. 
CONCLUSION 
Delaware’s Common Law incrementally based system will 
continue to adapt to accommodate needed change, and the balance of 
director authority and accountability will continue to acknowledge 
stockholders’ capacity to engage and exercise independent judgment. 
The balance may appear to shift on the margins from a director-centric 
model, but the shift will be more glacial than lightening striking. An 
occasional case will perhaps strike fear in the hearts of mankind, watch 
carefully for Rural Metro. But Delaware will largely remain thoughtful, 
predictable, and informed by facts and business practices. As far as 
change is concerned, that’s how it has been, that’s what it will be, and in 
my opinion, that’s how it should be. Thank you very much. 
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